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 Abstract 
Zayzoun dam is one of the irrigation elements of the valley of (Alkhab) in northern Syria; its exploitation started in 
1996 and breached on June 4th, 2002. There were many experts searching for the causes of its failure and the correct 
ways of its renovation. There were many reports written about the failure with different opinions, and we have been 
one of these experts with an objective opinion. The principal aim was to study all the technical and administrative 
components of the dam, and to analyze the existing and the new laboratory testing. The soil of the unfinished 
summit of the dam, in the end, was found to be the real cause that led to its failure. These causes will be analyzed in 
order to avoid them in the future and to find the suitable ways of its renovation and reinforcement. 
 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction    
 
The dam is surrounded by a curved alignment where the length of the dam crest is 5579m and its width is 6.0m. The 
classification of the dam is of class 2, with reservoir capacity of 71 million cubic meters and is used to irrigate 7-10 
thousand hectares of agriculture lands. The average of the catchment’s area at the dam site is about 5 million m3 per 
year. The Upstream and downstream shells consist of compacted angular well graded basalt stones [1]. 
The design drawings show that the dam is a rock filled dam with a central clay core which is flanked by two 
transition (filters) zones on the upstream side as well as on the downstream side. See the section and the photograph 
on the figure 1.   
The Dam’s height is 42.4 m at crest level 213.00 (A.S.L); the embankment freeboard is 3m, including 1m concrete 
parapet at the upstream edge of the crest. The dam design period was from 1985-1987, and its construction period 
was from 1989- 1995.Its inauguration has been since 1996 up to June 4th 2002, at 16:30 P.M., local time. The 
formation of these foundations are a basalt mass formation at the right flank of the dam and it continues under the 
clayey deposits that form the foundation of the dam body at the left flank of the dam. It has been noted that there are 
no vertical joints existing between the basalt mass and the clayey deposits, and the geological formation of the dam 
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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Administrative problems and lack of water management:  
The exploitation services neglected the traditional rule to keep a diary of the dam i.e. daily inspection of its visible 
conditions should enter in the diary whether the conditions are normal or not. If deviations are observed, they should 
be noticed. Moreover, there is a problem in management during the filling up of the water reservoir by using 
electrical bombing stations which should be turned off automatically when the water reservoir reaches its maximum 
level, but these stations were not conducted to the electrical power. 
The non-finished, non-well compacted soil of the cres:  
The most important construction failure was the exploitation of the dam which started without finishing the 
construction of the crest in the dam. This led to the creation of large cracks at the core summit of the dam and left 
the tracks moving on the unfinished crest which was not compacted and constructed according to the design; these 
are most probably one of the important reasons of the failure [2].        
Lack of monitoring and maintenance 
The control measurement facilities for the vertical and horizontal deformations on the crest were not built. The 
piezometers in the clay core and a part of the piezometers in the downstream slope toe were not constructed too. 
Also some of these existing piezometers were demolished; it was evident that the accident was not to be prevented 
considering the dam monitoring and maintenance plans. Reviewing all the documents and reports of the plans and 
specifications, we noticed that there was a lack of correct functioning of the exploitation services and a lack of 
regular monitoring measurements that are one of the main reasons fissures were discovered on the unprotected 
surface of the core, longitudinal and transverse. Those fissures were the result of shrinking and not of hard core 
and/or differential deformations and settlements. Also the fill up of the spillway and its use as a bridge at the 
knowledge of the authorities showed the irresponsible attitude of the employees concerned with the exploitation of 
the dam [3]. 
Technical problems found and analyzed:  
1) design problems: Reviewing the design calculations, we figured out that the design team and the design 
consultants have been acquainted with the geo – engineering investigations and the study of the local building 
materials where they chose the type of the dam. The dam type is (rock fill clay core). The base of Zayzoun dam 
possesses the necessary bearing, capacity, and safety which were checked by the following methods: Criteria of 
Jillboix, Theory of Carothers, Hencky method, Creager method. While doing these check-ups, the designer has the 
reason to work with the base characteristics which were obtained by testing in consolidated drained conditions. Back 
to the analysis of the results from the plans and specifications, soil –mechanical studies [4], the hydro geological 
parameters of the base, and after the stability of the base has been proved for the fixed height of the dam and the 
dimension of the dam body. For these check-ups, the soil-mechanical data for the base is used as well as the data for 
the fillings. These checkups are: A check-up for sliding on circle cylindrical surfaces (the Terzaghi method), 
checking for uplift pressure and the general stability of the dam.  Furthermore, the check up and the analysis have 
been made, and the results show that the dam Design has met the safety requirement [5].
2) differential settlements: An opinion about the fissures in the core due to differential settlements in the base is not 
precise; however the appearance of such fissures is refuted by our calculations to the conditions given in the geology 
report [6]. Insufficient shearing resistance and insufficient load capacity of plastic clay led to occurrence of pushing 
out and deep slipping, but this hasn’t been proven yet. According to the investigations for the design, the clays on 
the base are semi – plastic and hard plastic. Those clays were not observed during the accident. Deformations on the 
upstream and the natural ground beyond the dam wall existed before the dam failure. At the accident with Zayzoun 
dam no such deformations have been observed. We did make a check – up for fissure formation, due to differential 
vertical deformations, and the result was negative. The only possibility left for fissure formation due to shrinking 
was caused by uncompleted construction works on the crest and also by irregular interruption and restoration of the 
construction [7].  
3) Geotechnical problems, sliding, and material properties: The site geology formation is very complicated, but there 
is no geological fault in this site. The core of the dam is built of heterogeneous clays and could not be a reason for 
the failure, if only it was built with the necessary density. The fact that the water content is at the average 3% less 
than Wopt is not a reason for a failure because these samples are only 17% of the samples and Wopt is an admissible 
deviation for Wopt. The reason for the failure is pointed out to be the circumstance that the core does not possess 
elasticity and could not bear the stretch and shear tensions between profiles 60 and 67.  No definite opinion is 
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expressed on the validity of the investigation from 1985-1987 for the design work out, and the lithological layers of 
the investigations 2002-2003 are discussed without making a parallel comparison with the investigation of 1985-
1987. There is a question: could 17% of the monolith samples, having 3% less humidity than Wopt, classify the core 
as hard? An investigation for shearing of the rock fill should also be made with a modeling of the performed 
compacting [8]. It is not clear why the reasons for the failure are searched in the water saturation of the downstream 
and the sliding of this part of the dam body where no attention at all is paid to the possibility of erosion of the dam 
body. The layers have a consistency index of 0.60 to 0.87, checked–up with the formula: 
                                    
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Where Wl is the liquid limit, Wp is the plastic limit [9], and Ip is the plasticity index (from the appendix Z1 1986). 
The layer Z1 has a content of gravel fractions and sand – 50.47 %. 
It cannot be affirmed that the duration of the base consolidation in the central part of the dam is weak. The 
permeability coefficient checked up at borehole B3 is k = 1.10-4 cm/sec. The period for the construction of the dam 
and its exploitation is about 12 years. 
In the failure zone, the layer Z1 specified in the geological investigations from 1985 – 1987 has a consistency index 
Ic = 0.60, e.g. higher than those limiting the liquid – plastic consistency [10]. This layer is not inadmissible for a 
base, it is quite sufficient to consider its characteristics. 
The heterogeneous structure of the soils of which the core is built on cannot be a reason for the failure if every layer 
was sufficiently compacted, and the water content is at the average by 3% lower than the optimum water content 
according to proctor. It is known 2% less water content than the optimum is admissible, and the appropriate 
calculations show a difference w' = 1%, so this could not lead to the failure. The base consists of lithological 
layers Z1 with about 12 m thickness and Z4 with 3-4 m thickness on the surface. The designer team had the 
following data available from the geological investigation, see Figure 3): 
 
Table1. Soil mechanical characteristics
 
 
Permeability coefficient k =1.10-4 – 1.10-5 cm/s, Ip = 33.07, e .g. clays; Ic = 0.60, e.g. mid – plastic consistency. So 
far there is nothing contra – indicated to the construction of the dam.  
The test for the stability of the foundation is based on the working soil – mechanical Parameters as: Z4 =M  = 18 0, 
c= 0,704kg/cm2 and Z 1=  M  = 160, c = 0,518 kg/cm2, these parameters are obtained by means of a shearing test – 
drained consolidated condition. This is the correct treatment because the consolidation of the base is proved in the 
design. The pore pressure is dissipated simultaneously with the loading. For the needs of this analysis, the 
permeability coefficient was used, which was experimentally obtained on location with a seepage test. Also the slow 
shearing- as a method for laboratory testing- is applicable for construction of the dams with an appropriate rate. The 
report of the Agrocomplect took as a final result the UU tests, and they didn’t use the CD tests (See figure 4); the 
UU tests are less than the CD tests, and this led to a technical question [11]. 
 
Table 2. Layers and test were accomplished by Agrocomplect Company
Layer CD method U.U method 
Number of tests Friction angle M  Number of tests Friction angle M  
2-2 24 22.32 9 23.70 
3-1 6 14.93 3 31.11 
4-1 27 23.55 3 20.72 
Soil         percentages Z1  % Soil       percentages Z4
Clays              30,60% Clays        65 % 
Silt                    17,64% Silt          31. 86% 
Sand                11,75% Sand         2.14% 
Gravel            40,01%  
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Reviewing the report, and as stated above, we noticed that there were confusion in the investigation of 2002-2003.In 
spite of this confusion, the materials cannot be a reason for failure.  
4) Seepage causes: A seepage calculation, before and after the construction was performed as shown: LqQ . ,L= 
1315 m, Q=3685.4 m³/24h = 42.6l/s.  (Seepage calculation for the dam design before its construction is on the 
table 3 [12].   
 
Table 3. Total length and quantities of water seepage as the design calculation. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The measurement of the seepage calculations from the same area of the design of Zayzoun dam after its construction 
at the table 4. 
 
Table 4. The length and the quantities of water seepage after its reconstruction. 
N L 
m 
Kav 
m/24h 
Hav 
m 
Tav 
m 
2bav 
(m) 
Q 
m³/24h 
Place of testing 
tb
HJ

 
2
 
4 254 0.04 26 40 35.5 140 55,55W, 55S 0.34 
5 150 0.143 38 33 42 359 60,60W, 60S 0.5 
6 150 0.20 37 20 41 364 62-63W 0.6 
7 152 0.085 34 24 39 167 M2, M2S, 66W, 
66S, 65W, 65S 
0.54 
8 100 0.16 28 33 32.5 226 68W 0.43 
9 250 0.258 21 20 25.5 658 73 0.46 
10 263 0.18 17 10 21.5 255 84 0.54 
 
The embankment dam stability was assessed in relation to the changing conditions of loading and seepage régime 
which developed- from construction through first impounding- into operational service including reservoir 
drawdown. The seepage analysis has been made as shown in the calculation and we had the following marks: in 
1997 the seepage quantities were 37 l/s, which is greater than the design calculation, and this is due to : a) seepage 
quantities from the dam lake, and b) seepage quantities from the water table at that Year [11]. 
The measurements for this quantity of water seepage without the lake dam in the Year 2003 reached the value of 13 
l/s, (after the failure and while the lake was empty). Analyzing all the results from our documents and testing leads 
to the fact that the dam seepage met the safety requirement [13].
5) catastrophic problems: such as seismic and earthquakes, flooding: The investigations for earthquake conditions 
are not authoritative because they proved that no earthquakes were registered at the failure period. 
3. Analysis of the mechanism of the failure of the Zayzoun Dam (over topping) 
The first fill up of the reservoir was in 1996. In 1997 seepage through the dam foundations was noticed. This 
seepage was calculated and fixed, however the quantities of seepage water have no effect on the dam stability. The 
sliding happened while the water over flowed during the dam’s failure, but before that they were not observed. The 
famous American expert Shearard affirms in many works that such sliding take place slowly, i.e. if they existed, 
they ought to be noticed; however it was a result of overtopping due to non-finished and non- well compacted layers 
of the summit. According to the result of the geotechnical findings and material properties, we conclude that they 
N L 
( m) 
Kav 
(m/24h) 
Hav 
( m) 
Tav 
( m) 
2bav 
(m) 
Q 
m³/24h tb
HJ

 
2
 
4 254 0.54 31.4 6.5 36.4 652.5 0.73 
5 150 1 37.5 12 42.5 1259 0.69 
6 150 1.0 36.6 12.0 41.6 1229 0.68 
7 152 1.0 33.1 7.5 38.1 827.5 0.72 
8 100 0.2 27.9 8 32.9 109 0.68 
9 250 0.26 21.3 14.7 26.3 496.3 0.52 
10 263 0.2 17 18.9 22 413.2 0.42 
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designation of the lithological layers are brought, which when compared with the results from the 
investigations of 1985-1987, are more difficult.  
No definite opinion is expressed on the validity of the investigations of 1985-1987 design work out. The design 
team had the ability to use only the data.  
 The statement that all bulk densities of the fill materials are inflated is not proved in the cross-section (profile) 
of the dam where the zones of the rock fills have the biggest share. It was necessary to check-up their bulk 
density during the investigations of 2002 – 2003.The failure of the dam occurs in the section with base Z1 
having relatively good characteristics, and there shouldn’t be any sliding or differential settlements without 
conditions of development of inadmissible pore pressure. 
 The materials for the construction of the core varied unusually. No opinion is given if such materials are 
admissible. It is known that such materials have been used in lots of dams without leading to failures; it is
sufficient for them to be compacted in an appropriate manner. The thickness of the layers and its compaction 
were inappropriate, however this did not lead to dam failure.  
 The 2.5 layer is in the investigation- corresponds to layer Z4. According to the report from 1987, Z4 has a 
consistency index Ic = 0.60. The clays from the entire layer in the base are defined as slightly permeable. We 
cannot agree with this statement that layer Z1 has a permeability coefficient k > 1.10-4 cm/sec and not k = 1.10-8 
cm/sec as the expert team had assumed. This layer Z1 contains 50.4 % gravel and sand and 30% clays. The 
coefficient value k = 1.10-8 cm/sec refers only to the clay fraction and not to the layer in natural state. 
 It is known from the investigations of the competent American expert Shearard that the sliding that led to 
failure takes place slowly and therefore can be easily observed. 
 There were many reports addressing different causes of the failure of the dam. Such reports are not sufficient 
because they were lacking the correct information on the dam.  
 The Failure of this dam confirms that any safe and stable dam missing water management plans, plans for 
monitoring, and having non-finished parts of the dam even the summit leads to failure thus to huge economic 
losses. 
 The plan for rehabilitation of the dam cannot be achieved without knowing the real causes of the failure of the 
dam and not just addressing the results of the failures. 
 For the renovation of the dam, a further inspection of the remained body of the dam should be added in order 
to have the correct information about the stability of the dam. 
 The dam required renovation, reinforcement, and completion of the summit, not only at the section of the 
failure but at all areas because of the water effect on the core from the top.  
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